Cite as: 513 U. S. 432 (1995)
Thomas, J., dissenting
rules"). Or, one might as easily infer neutrality on the point from the statute's command that the court dispose of the petition "as law and justice require." 28 U. S. C. § 2243. Ultimately, we find no significant support for either side in any of this language. When faced with such gaps in the habeas statute, we have "look[ed] first to the considerations underlying our habeas jurisprudence, and then determine[d] whether the proposed rule would advance or inhibit these considerations by weighing the marginal costs and benefits of its application on collateral review." Brecht, 507 U. S., at 633. We have done that in this case, and for the reasons set forth above, see supra, at 442-443, we conclude that, when a habeas court is in grave doubt as to the harmlessness of an error that affects substantial rights, it should grant relief.
V
For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Thomas, with whom The Chief Justice and Justice Scalia join, dissenting.
In my view, a federal habeas court may not upset the results of a criminal trial unless it concludes both that the trial was marred by a violation of the Constitution or a federal statute and that this error was harmful. Because the Court concludes otherwise, I respectfully dissent.
I
Though the majority begins with an examination of precedent construing the federal harmless-error statute, 28 U. S. C. § 2111, the proper place to begin is with the statute governing habeas relief for prisoners in state custody. After all, the petitioner does not seek relief under the harmless-error statute.
445
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