Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 8 (1995)

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Cite as: 514 U. S. 476 (1995)

Opinion of the Court

III

Both the lower courts and the parties agree that respondent seeks to disclose only truthful, verifiable, and nonmis-leading factual information about alcohol content on its beer labels. Thus, our analysis focuses on the substantiality of the interest behind § 205(e)(2) and on whether the labeling ban bears an acceptable fit with the Government's goal. A careful consideration of these factors indicates that § 205(e)(2) violates the First Amendment's protection of commercial speech.

A

The Government identifies two interests it considers sufficiently "substantial" to justify § 205(e)(2)'s labeling ban. First, the Government contends that § 205(e)(2) advances Congress' goal of curbing "strength wars" by beer brewers who might seek to compete for customers on the basis of alcohol content. According to the Government, the FAAA's restriction prevents a particular type of beer drinker—one

U. S. 109, 138 (1972) (holding that States may ban nude dancing in bars and nightclubs that serve liquor).

Neither Edge Broadcasting nor Posadas compels us to craft an exception to the Central Hudson standard, for in both of those cases we applied the Central Hudson analysis. Indeed, Edge Broadcasting specifically avoided reaching the argument the Government makes here because the Court found that the regulation in question passed muster under Central Hudson. 509 U. S., at 425. To be sure, Posadas did state that the Puerto Rico Government could ban promotional advertising of casino gambling because it could have prohibited gambling altogether. 478 U. S., at 346. But the Court reached this argument only after it already had found that the state regulation survived the Central Hudson test. See 478 U. S., at 340-344. The Court raised the Government's point in response to an alternative claim that Puerto Rico's regulation was inconsistent with Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U. S. 678 (1977), and Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U. S. 809 (1975). Posadas, supra, at 345-346.

Nor does LaRue support the Government's position. LaRue did not involve commercial speech about alcohol, but instead concerned the regulation of nude dancing in places where alcohol was served. 409 U. S., at 114.

483

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