296
Opinion of the Court
tioner sold seems high, the quantities of other narcotics a defendant would have to sell to receive a comparable sentence under the statute yield far more doses, see United States v. Marshall, 908 F. 2d 1312, 1334 (CA7 1990) (Posner, J., dissenting), aff'd sub nom. Chapman v. United States, 500 U. S. 453 (1991).) Even so, Congress, not this Court, has the responsibility for revising its statutes. Were we to alter our statutory interpretations from case to case, Congress would have less reason to exercise its responsibility to correct statutes that are thought to be unwise or unfair.
Like Chapman, this case involves a petitioner who sold LSD on blotter paper, the "carrier of choice" involved in "the vast majority of cases." 500 U. S., at 466. Just as we declined in Chapman to entertain "hypothetical cases . . . involving very heavy carriers and very little LSD" in resolving a due process challenge, ibid., we do not address how § 841(b)(1) should be applied in those cases.
We hold that § 841(b)(1) directs a sentencing court to take into account the actual weight of the blotter paper with its absorbed LSD, even though the Sentencing Guidelines require a different method of calculating the weight of an LSD mixture or substance. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
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