Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 16 (1996)

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340

FULTON CORP. v. FAULKNER

Opinion of the Court

that the taxes are apparently different (quite apart from stated rates) in a number of obvious respects, including the parties ostensibly taxed. Something more than mere influence of the one stated tax base on the value of the other would therefore be necessary before we could conclude that equivalent events (or "values") are taxed. The nature of that something more flows from the objective of the equivalent-event requirement, which is to enable in-state and out-of-state businesses to compete on a footing of equality. In Silas Mason, for example, we observed that "[t]he practical effect" of Washington's sales/use tax regime "must be that retail sellers in Washington will be helped to compete upon terms of equality with retail dealers in other states who are exempt from a sales tax or any corresponding burden." 300 U. S., at 581; see also Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U. S. 64, 70 (1963) ("[E]qual treatment for in-state and out-of-state taxpayers similarly situated is the condition precedent for a valid use tax on goods imported from out-of-state"). This equality of treatment does not appear when the allegedly compensating taxes fall respectively on taxpayers who are differently described, as, for example, resident shareholders and corporations doing business out of state. A State defending such a scheme as one of complementary taxation, therefore, has the burden of showing that the actual incidences of the two tax burdens are different enough from their nominal incidences so that the real taxpayers are within the same class, and that therefore a finding of combined neutrality on interstate competition would at least be possible.6

6 Silas Mason makes clear that actual incidence upon the same class of taxpayers is a necessary condition for a finding that two taxes are complementary. Our analysis has sometimes focused upon other factors, however, see, e. g., Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U. S. 638, 643 (1984), and we need not decide today whether identity of tax incidence is sufficient to compel the conclusion that two taxes fall upon substantially equivalent events.

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