44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U. S. 484 (1996)

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Cite as: 517 U. S. 484 (1996)

Opinion of Stevens, J.

differences" that exist between commercial messages and other types of protected expression. 425 U. S., at 771, n. 24. Our opinion noted that the greater "objectivity" of commercial speech justifies affording the State more freedom to distinguish false commercial advertisements from true ones, ibid., and that the greater "hardiness" of commercial speech, inspired as it is by the profit motive, likely diminishes the chilling effect that may attend its regulation, ibid.

Subsequent cases explained that the State's power to regulate commercial transactions justifies its concomitant power to regulate commercial speech that is "linked inextricably" to those transactions. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U. S. 1, 10, n. 9 (1979); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U. S. 447, 456 (1978) (commercial speech "occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation"). As one commentator has explained: "The entire commercial speech doctrine, after all, represents an accommodation between the right to speak and hear expression about goods and services and the right of government to regulate the sales of such goods and services." L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 12-15, p. 903 (2d ed. 1988). Nevertheless, as we explained in Lin-mark, the State retains less regulatory authority when its commercial speech restrictions strike at "the substance of the information communicated" rather than the "commercial aspect of [it]—with offerors communicating offers to offerees." 431 U. S., at 96; Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U. S., at 701, n. 28.

In Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 557 (1980), we took stock of our developing commercial speech jurisprudence. In that case, we considered a regulation "completely" banning all promotional advertising by electric utilities. Ibid. Our decision acknowledged the special features of commercial speech but identified the serious First Amendment concerns that attend blanket advertising prohibitions that do not protect consumers from commercial harms.

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