Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 4 (1996)

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Cite as: 518 U. S. 322 (1996)

Opinion of the Court

the maximum aggregate sentence faced. Id., at 254-255. Because each offense charged here was petty in character, the court concluded that petitioner was not entitled to a jury trial.

The court explained in dictum that because the character of the offense as petty or serious determined the right to a jury trial, not the sentence faced, a trial judge's self-imposed limitation on sentencing could not deprive a defendant of the right to a jury trial. Id., at 255-256.

We granted certiorari, 516 U. S. 1088 (1996), to resolve a conflict in the Courts of Appeals over whether a defendant prosecuted in a single proceeding for multiple petty offenses has a constitutional right to a jury trial, where the aggregate sentence authorized for the offenses exceeds six months' imprisonment, and whether such jury trial right can be eliminated by a judge's pretrial commitment that the aggregate sentence imposed will not exceed six months. See United States v. Coppins, 953 F. 2d 86 (CA4 1991); United States v. Bencheck, 926 F. 2d 1512 (CA10 1991); Rife v. Godbehere, 814 F. 2d 563 (CA9 1987).

II

The Sixth Amendment guarantees that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . ." It is well established that the Sixth Amendment, like the common law, reserves this jury trial right for prosecutions of serious offenses, and that "there is a category of petty crimes or offenses which is not subject to the Sixth Amendment jury trial provision." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 159 (1968).

To determine whether an offense is properly characterized as "petty," courts at one time looked to the nature of the offense and whether it was triable by a jury at common law. Such determinations became difficult, because many statutory offenses lack common-law antecedents. Blanton v.

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