Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604, 31 (1996)

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634

COLORADO REPUBLICAN FEDERAL CAMPAIGN COMM. v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N

Opinion of Thomas, J.

and testing the fit between that end and the means used to achieve it.2

The validity of § 441a(d)(3)'s controls on coordinated expenditures is an open question that, if left unanswered, will inhibit the exercise of legitimate First Amendment activity nationwide. All Justice Breyer resolves is that when a political party spends money in support of a candidate (or against his opponent) and the Government cannot thereafter prove any coordination between the party and the candidate, the party cannot be punished by the Government for that spending. This settles little, if anything. Parties are left to wonder whether their speech is protected by the First Amendment when the Government can show—presumably with circumstantial evidence—a link between the party and the candidate with respect to the speech in question. And of course, one of the main purposes of a political party is to support its candidates in elections.

The constitutionality of limits on coordinated expenditures by political parties is squarely before us. We should address this important question now, instead of leaving political parties in a state of uncertainty about the types of First Amendment expression in which they are free to engage.

2 Justice Breyer's remaining arguments for avoiding the facial challenge are straw men. See ante, at 625 (if § 441a(d)(3) were invalidated in its entirety, other FECA provisions that the Party has not challenged might apply to coordinated party expenditures); ibid. (if § 441a(d)(3) were upheld as to coordinated expenditures but invalidated as to independent expenditures, issues of severability would be raised). That resolution of the primary question in this case (the constitutionality of § 441a(d)(3) with respect to all expenditures) might generate issues not previously considered (such as severability) is no reason for not deciding the question itself. Without suggesting that remand is the only appropriate way to deal with possible corollary matters in this case or that these arguments have merit, I point out that we can, of course, decide the central question without ruling on the issues that concern Justice Breyer.

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