Cite as: 520 U. S. 329 (1997)
Scalia, J., concurring
IV
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded with instructions to remand to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Kennedy joins, concurring.
I agree with the Court that under the test set forth in Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 U. S. 418, 423 (1987), and Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Assn., 496 U. S. 498, 509 (1990), 42 U. S. C. § 1983 does not permit individual beneficiaries of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, as added, 88 Stat. 2351, and as amended, 42 U. S. C. §§ 651-669b (1994 ed., Supp. II), to bring suit challenging a State's failure to achieve "substantial compliance" with the requirements of Title IV-D. That conclusion makes it unnecessary to reach the question whether § 1983 ever authorizes the beneficiaries of a federal-state funding and spending agreement—such as Title IV-D—to bring suit.
As we explained in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981), such an agreement is "in the nature of a contract," id., at 17: The State promises to provide certain services to private individuals, in exchange for which the Federal Government promises to give the State funds. In contract law, when such an arrangement is made (A promises to pay B money, in exchange for which B promises to provide services to C), the person who receives the benefit of the exchange of promises between the two others (C) is called a third-party beneficiary. Until relatively recent times, the third-party beneficiary was generally regarded as a stranger to the contract, and could not sue upon it; that is to say, if, in the example given above, B broke his promise and did not provide services to C, the only person who could enforce the promise in court was the other party
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