396
Opinion of the Court
the Magistrate could not have anticipated in every particular the circumstances that would confront the officers when they arrived at Richards' motel room.7 These actual circumstances—petitioner's apparent recognition of the officers combined with the easily disposable nature of the drugs— justified the officers' ultimate decision to enter without first announcing their presence and authority.
Accordingly, although we reject the blanket exception to the knock-and-announce requirement for felony drug investigations, the judgment of the Wisconsin Supreme Court is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
7 A number of States give magistrate judges the authority to issue "no-knock" warrants if the officers demonstrate ahead of time a reasonable suspicion that entry without prior announcement will be appropriate in a particular context. See, e. g., 725 Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 725, § 5/108-8 (1992); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-411 (1995); Okla. Stat., Tit. 22, § 1228 (Supp. 1997); S. D. Codified Laws § 23A-35-9 (1988); Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-210 (1995). But see State v. Arce, 83 Ore. App. 185, 730 P. 2d 1260 (1986) (magistrate has no authority to abrogate knock-and-announce requirement); State v. Bamber, 630 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 1994) (same).
The practice of allowing magistrates to issue no-knock warrants seems entirely reasonable when sufficient cause to do so can be demonstrated ahead of time. But, as the facts of this case demonstrate, a magistrate's decision not to authorize a no-knock entry should not be interpreted to remove the officers' authority to exercise independent judgment concerning the wisdom of a no-knock entry at the time the warrant is being executed.
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