Cite as: 520 U. S. 681 (1997)
Opinion of the Court
First, because the claim of immunity is asserted in a federal court and relies heavily on the doctrine of separation of powers that restrains each of the three branches of the Federal Government from encroaching on the domain of the other two, see, e. g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 122 (1976) (per curiam), it is not necessary to consider or decide whether a comparable claim might succeed in a state tribunal. If this case were being heard in a state forum, instead of advancing a separation-of-powers argument, petitioner would presumably rely on federalism and comity concerns,13
as well as the interest in protecting federal officials from possible local prejudice that underlies the authority to remove certain cases brought against federal officers from a state to a federal court, see 28 U. S. C. § 1442(a); Mesa v. California, 489 U. S. 121, 125-126 (1989). Whether those concerns would present a more compelling case for immunity is a question that is not before us.
Second, our decision rejecting the immunity claim and allowing the case to proceed does not require us to confront the question whether a court may compel the attendance of the President at any specific time or place. We assume that the testimony of the President, both for discovery and for use at trial, may be taken at the White House at a time that
as a proper exercise of judicial discretion, may stay such litigation until the President leaves office." Our review is confined to these issues. See this Court's Rule 14.1(a).
13 Because the Supremacy Clause makes federal law "the supreme Law of the Land," Art. VI, cl. 2, any direct control by a state court over the President, who has principal responsibility to ensure that those laws are "faithfully executed," Art. II, § 3, may implicate concerns that are quite different from the interbranch separation-of-powers questions addressed here. Cf., e. g., Hancock v. Train, 426 U. S. 167, 178-179 (1976); Mayo v. United States, 319 U. S. 441, 445 (1943). See L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 513 (2d ed. 1988) ("[A]bsent explicit congressional consent no state may command federal officials . . . to take action in derogation of their . . . federal responsibilities").
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