Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911 (1997)

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OCTOBER TERM, 1996

Syllabus

JOHNSON et al. v. FANKELL

certiorari to the supreme court of idaho

No. 96-292. Argued February 26, 1997—Decided June 9, 1997

Respondent filed this 42 U. S. C. § 1983 damages action in Idaho state court, alleging that the termination of her state employment by petitioner officials deprived her of property without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The trial court denied petitioners' motion to dismiss, which asserted that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The Idaho Supreme Court dismissed their appeal from that ruling, explaining that the denial was neither an appealable final order under Idaho Appellate Rule 11(a)(1) nor appealable as a matter of federal right under § 1983.

Held: Defendants in a state-court § 1983 action do not have a federal right to an interlocutory appeal from a denial of qualified immunity. Pp. 914-923. (a) State officials performing discretionary functions have a "qualified immunity" defense that, in appropriate circumstances, shields them both from liability for damages under § 1983 and from the burdens of trial. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 818. A federal district court order rejecting such a defense on the ground that the defendant's actions—if proved—would have violated clearly established law may be appealed immediately as a "final decision" under the general federal appellate jurisdiction statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1291. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 524-530. Relying on respondent's federal statutory claim and their own federal defense, petitioners submit that the Idaho courts must protect their right to avoid the burdens of trial by allowing the same inter-locutory appeal that would be available in a federal court. Pp. 914-916. (b) This Court rejects petitioners' argument that when the Idaho courts construe their own Rule 11(a)(1), they must accept the federal definition of a "final decision" in cases brought under § 1983. Even if the Idaho Rule and § 1291 contained identical language—and they do not—the Idaho Supreme Court's interpretation of the Rule would be binding on federal courts, which have no authority to place a different construction upon it. See, e. g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 767. Idaho could voluntarily place the same construction on the Rule as the Mitchell Court placed on § 1291, but this Court cannot command that choice. Pp. 916-918. (c) Also unpersuasive is petitioners' contention that Rule 11(a)(1) is pre-empted by § 1983 to the extent that it does not allow an interlocu-

911

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