Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U. S. 968 (1997) (per curiam)

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Cite as: 520 U. S. 968 (1997)

Per Curiam

The District Court has not yet reconsidered the merits of the preliminary injunction motion, but it has entered (based on the parties' stipulations) an injunction pending appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(c), and has postponed its hearing on the preliminary injunction motion until our disposition of petitioner's certiorari petition. Order Granting Injunction Pending Appeal, No. CV 95-083- GF-PGH (Mont., Nov. 5, 1996), App. to Pet. for Cert. 31a- 32a. As a consequence, Montana's physician-only requirement is unenforceable at the present time against respondent Susan Cahill, who is the only nonphysician licensed to perform abortions in Montana.

The Court of Appeals' conclusion that respondents had established a "fair chance of success on the merits" of their constitutional challenge is inconsistent with our treatment of the physician-only requirement at issue in Casey. That requirement involved only the provision of information to patients, and not the actual performance of abortions, yet we nonetheless held—overruling our prior holding in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U. S. 416, 448 (1983)—that the limitation to physicians was valid. Casey, supra, at 884-885. We found that "[s]ince there is no evidence on this record that requiring a doctor to give the information as provided by the statute would amount in practical terms to a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion, . . . it is not an undue burden." 505 U. S., at 884-885 (emphasis added). The District Court, quoting this precise passage, held: "There exists insufficient evidence in the record to support the conclusion [that] the requirement that a licensed physician perform an abortion would amount, 'in practical terms, to a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion.' Accordingly, it is unlikely that [respondents] will prevail upon their suggestion that the requirement constitutes an 'undue burden' within the meaning of Casey." 906 F. Supp., at 567 (quoting Casey, supra, at 884 (emphasis added)).

971

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