General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 7 (1997)

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142

GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. v. JOINER

Opinion of the Court

the subject go back as far as Spring Co. v. Edgar, 99 U. S. 645, 658 (1879), where we said that "[c]ases arise where it is very much a matter of discretion with the court whether to receive or exclude the evidence; but the appellate court will not reverse in such a case, unless the ruling is manifestly erroneous." The Court of Appeals suggested that Daubert somehow altered this general rule in the context of a district court's decision to exclude scientific evidence. But Daubert did not address the standard of appellate review for evidentiary rulings at all. It did hold that the "austere" Frye standard of "general acceptance" had not been carried over into the Federal Rules of Evidence. But the opinion also said:

"That the Frye test was displaced by the Rules of Evidence does not mean, however, that the Rules themselves place no limits on the admissibility of purportedly scientific evidence. Nor is the trial judge disabled from screening such evidence. To the contrary, under the Rules the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable." 509 U. S., at 589 (footnote omitted).

Thus, while the Federal Rules of Evidence allow district courts to admit a somewhat broader range of scientific testimony than would have been admissible under Frye, they leave in place the "gatekeeper" role of the trial judge in screening such evidence. A court of appeals applying "abuse-of-discretion" review to such rulings may not categorically distinguish between rulings allowing expert testimony and rulings disallowing it. Compare Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U. S. 153, 172 (1988) (applying abuse-of-discretion review to a lower court's decision to exclude evidence), with United States v. Abel, supra, at 54 (applying abuse-of-discretion review to a lower court's decision to admit evidence). We likewise reject respondent's argument that because the granting of summary judgment in this case

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