Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 26 (1998)

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Cite as: 523 U. S. 83 (1998)

Stevens, J., concurring in judgment

In every previous case in which the Court has denied standing because of a lack of redressability, the plaintiff was challenging some governmental action or inaction. Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U. S. 83, 85-87 (1981) (per curiam) (suit against Director of the Department of Corrections and another prison official); Simon, 426 U. S., at 28 (suit against the Secretary of the Treasury and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 493 (1975) (suit against the town of Penfield and members of Penfield's Zoning, Planning, and Town Boards); Linda R. S., 410 U. S., at 615-616, 619 (suit against prosecutor); see also Renne v. Geary, 501 U. S. 312, 314 (1991) (suit against the city and County of San Francisco, its board of supervisors, and other local officials).19 None of these cases involved an attempt by one private party to impose a statutory sanction on another private party.20

In addition, in every other case in which this Court has held that there is no standing because of a lack of redressability, the injury to the plaintiff by the defendant was indirect (e. g., dependent on the action of a third party). This is true in the two cases that the Court cites for the "redress-ability" prong, ante, at 103; see also Simon, 426 U. S., at 40-46 ("[T]he 'case or controversy' limitation of Art. III . . . requires that a federal court act only to redress injury that fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant,

19 Although the Court discussed redressability, Renne did not in fact turn on that issue. While the Court stated that "[t]here is reason to doubt . . . that the injury alleged . . . can be redressed" by the relief sought, 501 U. S., at 319, it then went on to hold that the claims were nonjusticiable because "respondents have not demonstrated a live controversy ripe for resolution by the federal courts," id., at 315, 320-324.

20 This distinction is significant, as our standing doctrine is rooted in separation-of-powers concerns. E. g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 573-578 (1992); Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 750 (1984); see also infra, at 129-130.

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