Cite as: 523 U. S. 185 (1998)
Opinion of the Court
to his codefendant, Marsh—"indeed, to omit all indication that anyone other than . . . Williams" and a third person had "participated in the crime." Id., at 203 (emphasis in original). The trial court also instructed the jury not to consider the confession against Marsh. Id., at 205. As redacted, the confession indicated that Williams and the third person had discussed the murder in the front seat of a car while they traveled to the victim's house. Id., at 203-204, n. 1. The redacted confession contained no indication that Marsh—or any other person—was in the car. Ibid. Later in the trial, however, Marsh testified that she was in the back seat of the car. Id., at 204. For that reason, in context, the confession still could have helped convince the jury that Marsh knew about the murder in advance and therefore had participated knowingly in the crime.
The Court held that this redacted confession fell outside Bruton's scope and was admissible (with appropriate limiting instructions) at the joint trial. The Court distinguished Evans' confession in Bruton as a confession that was "incriminating on its face," and which had "expressly implicat[ed]" Bruton. 481 U. S., at 208. By contrast, Williams' confession amounted to "evidence requiring linkage" in that it "became" incriminating in respect to Marsh "only when linked with evidence introduced later at trial." Ibid. The Court held
"that the Confrontation Clause is not violated by the admission of a nontestifying codefendant's confession with a proper limiting instruction when, as here, the confession is redacted to eliminate not only the defend-ant's name, but any reference to his or her existence." Id., at 211.
The Court added: "We express no opinion on the admissibility of a confession in which the defendant's name has been replaced with a symbol or neutral pronoun." Id., at 211, n. 5.
191
Page: Index Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 NextLast modified: October 4, 2007