Cite as: 523 U. S. 392 (1998)
Syllabus
duties, the Louisiana foreperson has the same full voting powers as other grand jury members. As a result, when the Louisiana judge selected the foreperson, he also selected one member of the grand jury outside of the drawing system used to compose the balance of that body. Pp. 396-397.
(b) Campbell, like any other white defendant, has standing under Powers, supra, to raise an equal protection challenge to the discriminatory selection of his grand jury. The excluded jurors' own right not to be discriminatorily denied grand jury service can be asserted by Campbell because he satisfies the three preconditions for third-party standing outlined in Powers, supra, at 411. First, regardless of skin color, an accused suffers a significant "injury in fact" when the grand jury's composition is tainted by racial discrimination. The integrity of the body's decisions depends on the integrity of the process used to select the grand jurors. If that process is infected with racial discrimination, doubt is cast over the fairness of all subsequent decisions. See Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545, 555-556. The Court rejects the State's argument that no harm is inflicted when a single grand juror is selected based on racial prejudice because the discrimination is invisible to the grand jurors on that panel, and only becomes apparent when a pattern emerges over the course of years. This argument underestimates the seriousness of the allegations here: If they are true, the impartiality and discretion of the judge himself would be called into question. Second, Campbell has a "close relationship" to the excluded jurors, who share with him a common interest in eradicating discrimination from the grand jury selection process, and a vital interest in asserting their rights because his conviction may be overturned as a result. See, e. g., Powers, 499 U. S., at 413-414. The State's argument that Campbell has but a tenuous connection to jurors excluded in the past confuses his underlying claim—that black persons were excluded from his grand jury—with the evidence needed to prove it—that similarly situated venirepersons were excluded in previous cases on account of intentional discrimination. Third, given the economic burdens of litigation and the small financial reward available, a grand juror excluded because of race has little incentive to sue to vindicate his own rights. See id., at 415. Pp. 397-400.
(c) A white defendant alleging discriminatory selection of grand jurors has standing to litigate whether his conviction was procured by means or procedures which contravene due process. Hobby, supra, at 350, proceeded on the implied assumption that such standing exists. The Louisiana Supreme Court's reading of Hobby as foreclosing Camp-bell's standing is inconsistent with that implicit assumption and with the Court's explicit reasoning in Hobby. Campbell's challenge is different
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