250
Opinion of the Court
tificates of appealability and motions for second or successive applications were enacted in the same statute. The clear limit on this Court's jurisdiction to review denials of motions to file second or successive petitions by writ of certiorari contrasts with the absence of an analogous limitation to certiorari review of denials of applications for certificates of appealability. True, the phrase concerning the grant or denial of second or successive applications refers to an action "by a court of appeals"; still, we think a Congress concerned enough to bar our jurisdiction in one instance would have been just as explicit in denying it in the other, were that its intention. See, e. g., Bates v. United States, 522 U. S. 23, 29-30 (1997) (" '[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion' ") (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983) (other internal quotation marks omitted)). The dissent claims the absence of similar language in § 2253(c) can be explained by Congress' reliance on the rule holding certificate applications unreviewable under § 1254(1). Post, at 261-262. As we later discuss, any such reliance is lessened by the Court's consistent practice of treating denials of certificate applications as falling within its statutory certiorari jurisdiction. See infra, at 252.
Today's holding conforms our commonsense practice to the statutory scheme, making it unnecessary to invoke our extraordinary jurisdiction in routine cases, which present important and meritorious claims. The United States does not dispute that Hohn's claim has considerable merit and acknowledges that the trial court committed an error of constitutional magnitude. The only contested issue is whether the constitutional violation was a substantial one. Brief in Opposition 7-8. Were we to adopt the position advanced by the dissent, the only way we could consider his meritorious claim would be through the All Writs Act, 28 U. S. C.
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