Cite as: 527 U. S. 581 (1999)
Syllabus
Justice Stevens would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, but because there are not five votes for that disposition, joined the Court's judgment and Parts I, II, and III-A of its opinion. Pp. 607-608.
Justice Kennedy concluded that the case must be remanded for a determination of the questions the Court poses and for a determination whether respondents can show a violation of 42 U. S. C. § 12132's ban on discrimination based on the summary judgment materials on file or any further pleadings and materials properly allowed. On the ordinary interpretation and meaning of the term, one who alleges discrimination must show that she received differential treatment vis-à-vis members of a different group on the basis of a statutorily described characteristic. Thus, respondents could demonstrate discrimination by showing that Georgia (i) provides treatment to individuals suffering from medical problems of comparable seriousness, (ii) as a general matter, does so in the most integrated setting appropriate for the treatment of those problems (taking medical and other practical considerations into account), but (iii) without adequate justification, fails to do so for a group of mentally disabled persons (treating them instead in separate, locked institutional facilities). This inquiry would not be simple. Comparisons of different medical conditions and the corresponding treatment regimens might be difficult, as would be assessments of the degree of integration of various settings in which medical treatment is offered. Thus far, respondents have identified no class of similarly situated individuals, let alone shown them to have been given preferential treatment. Without additional information, the Court cannot address the issue in the way the statute demands. As a consequence, the partial summary judgment granted respondents ought not to be sustained. In addition, it was error in the earlier proceedings to restrict the relevance and force of the State's evidence regarding the comparative costs of treatment. The State is entitled to wide discretion in adopting its own systems of cost analysis, and, if it chooses, to allocate health care resources based on fixed and overhead costs for whole institutions and programs. The lower courts should determine in the first instance whether a statutory violation is sufficiently alleged and supported in respondents' summary judgment materials and, if not, whether they should be given leave to replead and to introduce evidence and argument along the lines suggested. Pp. 611-615.
Ginsburg, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, and III-A, in which Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., joined, and an opin-
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