316
Opinion of the Court
tory challenge. Rather, he used the challenge in line with a principal reason for peremptories: to help secure the constitutional guarantee of trial by an impartial jury. See, e. g., J. E. B., 511 U. S., at 137, n. 8 (purpose of peremptory challenges " 'is to permit litigants to assist the government in the selection of an impartial trier of fact' ") (quoting Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U. S. 614, 620 (1991)); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U. S. 42, 57 (1992) (peremptory challenges are "one state-created means to the constitutional end of an impartial jury and a fair trial"); Frazier v. United States, 335 U. S. 497, 505 (1948) ("the right [to peremptory challenges] is given in aid of the party's interest to secure a fair and impartial jury"). Moreover, the immediate choice Martinez-Salazar confronted—to stand on his objection to the erroneous denial of the challenge for cause or to use a peremptory challenge to effect an instantaneous cure of the error—comports with the reality of the jury selection process. Challenges for cause and rulings upon them, as Judge Rymer observed, see supra, at 310, are fast paced, made on the spot and under pressure. Counsel as well as court, in that setting, must be prepared to decide, often between shades of gray, "by the minute." 146 F. 3d, at 661.
In conclusion, we note what this case does not involve. It is not asserted that the trial court deliberately misapplied the law in order to force the defendants to use a peremptory challenge to correct the court's error. See Ross, 487 U. S., at 91, n. 5. Accordingly, no question is presented here whether such an error would warrant reversal. Nor did the District Court's ruling result in the seating of any juror who should have been dismissed for cause. As we have recognized, that circumstance would require reversal. See id., at 85 ("Had [the biased juror] sat on the jury that ultimately sentenced petitioner to death, and had petitioner properly preserved his right to challenge the trial court's failure to remove [the juror] for cause, the sentence would have to be overturned."); see also Parker v. Gladden, 385 U. S. 363, 366
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