506
Opinion of the Court
ently wrongful under RICO. The specific type of act that is analogous to an act of a tortious character may depend on the underlying substantive violation the defendant is alleged to have committed.9 However, respondents' alleged overt act in furtherance of their conspiracy is not independently wrongful under any substantive provision of the statute. Injury caused by such an act is not, therefore, sufficient to give rise to a cause of action under § 1964(c).10
Petitioner challenges this view of the statute under the longstanding canon of statutory construction that terms in a statute should not be construed so as to render any provision of that statute meaningless or superfluous. He asserts that under our view of the statute, any person who had a claim for a violation of § 1962(d) would necessarily have a claim for a violation of § 1962(a), (b), or (c). However, contrary to petitioner's assertions, our interpretation of § 1962(d) does not render it mere surplusage. Under our interpretation, a plaintiff could, through a § 1964(c) suit for a violation of
9 For example, most courts of appeals have adopted the so-called investment injury rule, which requires that a plaintiff suing for a violation of § 1962(a) allege injury from the defendant's "use or invest[ment]" of income derived from racketeering activity, see § 1962(a). See, e. g., Crowe v. Henry, 43 F. 3d 198, 205 (CA5 1995); Vemco, Inc. v. Camardella, 23 F. 3d 129, 132 (CA6) (collecting cases), cert. denied, 513 U. S. 1017 (1994). Although we express no view on this issue, arguably a plaintiff suing for a violation of § 1962(d) based on an agreement to violate § 1962(a) is required to allege injury from the "use or invest[ment]" of illicit proceeds.
10 Respondents argue that a § 1962(d) claim must be predicated on an actionable violation of §§ 1962(a)-(c). However, the merit of this view is a different (albeit related) issue from the one on which we granted certiorari, namely, whether a plaintiff can bring a § 1962(d) claim for injury flowing from an overt act that is not an act of racketeering. Therefore, contrary to Justice Stevens' suggestion, see post, at 511-512, we do not resolve whether a plaintiff suing under § 1964(c) for a RICO conspiracy must allege an actionable violation under §§ 1962(a)-(c), or whether it is sufficient for the plaintiff to allege an agreement to complete a substantive violation and the commission of at least one act of racketeering that caused him injury.
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