Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N. A., 530 U.S. 1, 10 (2000)

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10

HARTFORD UNDERWRITERS INS. CO. v. UNION PLANTERS BANK, N. A.

Opinion of the Court

(WD Ky. 1936), aff'd, 93 F. 2d 1008 (CA6 1938), but sometimes independently, see In re Chapman Coal Co., 196 F. 2d 779, 780 (CA7 1952); In re Rotary Tire & Rubber Co., 2 F. 2d 364 (CA6 1924). Petitioner also relies on early decisions of this Court allowing individual claimants to seek recovery from secured assets, see Louisville, E. & St. L. R. Co. v. Wilson, 138 U. S. 501, 506 (1891); Burnham v. Bowen, 111 U. S. 776, 779, 783 (1884); New York Dock Co. v. S. S. Poznan, 274 U. S. 117, 121 (1927). Wilson and Burnham involved equity receiverships, and were not only pre-Code, but predate the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 that the Code replaced; while New York Dock was a case arising in admiralty.

It is questionable whether these precedents establish a bankruptcy practice sufficiently widespread and well recognized to justify the conclusion of implicit adoption by the Code. We have no confidence that the allowance of recovery from collateral by nontrustees is "the type of 'rule' that . . . Congress was aware of when enacting the Code." United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U. S., at 246. Cf. Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U. S. 410, 418 (1992) (re-lying on "clearly established" pre-Code practice); Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U. S. 36, 46 (1986) (giving weight to pre-Code practice that was "widely accepted" and "established"). In any event, while pre-Code practice "informs our understanding of the language of the Code," id., at 44, it cannot overcome that language. It is a tool of construction, not an extratextual supplement. We have applied it to the construction of provisions which were "subject to interpretation," id., at 50, or contained "ambiguity in the text," Dewsnup, supra, at 417. "[W]here the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code's text is itself clear . . . its operation is unimpeded by contrary . . . prior practice," BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation, 511 U. S. 531, 546 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). See, e. g., Pennsylvania Dept. of Public Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U. S. 552, 563 (1990); United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., supra, at 245-246.

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