224
Breyer, J., dissenting
The majority, in footnote 6, says that the words "at the corporate level" in § 108(d)(7)(A) apply to the exclusion of COD income from corporate income and to "tax attribute reduction," but do not "suspen[d] the operation of . . . ordinary pass-through rules" because § 108(d)(7)(A) "does not state or imply that the debt discharge provisions shall apply only 'at the corporate level.' " It is the majority, however, that should explain why it reads the provision as nonexclusive (where, as here, its interpretation of the Code results in the "practical equivalent of [a] double deduction," Charles Ilfeld Co. v. Hernandez, 292 U. S. 62, 68 (1934)). See United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U. S. 678, 684 (1969) (requiring "clear declaration of intent by Congress" in such circumstances). I do not contend that § 108(d)(7)(A) must be read as having exclusive effect, only that, given the alternative, this interpretation provides the best reading of § 108 as a whole. And I can find no "clear declaration of intent by Congress" to support the majority's contrary conclusion regarding § 108(d)(7)(A)'s effect. It is that conclusion from which, for the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent.
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