Lujan v. G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc., 532 U.S. 189, 8 (2001)

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196

LUJAN v. G & G FIRE SPRINKLERS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

(1979)). In Good, we held that the Government must afford the owner of a house subject to forfeiture as property used to commit or to facilitate commission of a federal drug offense notice and a hearing before seizing the property. 510 U. S., at 62. In Barchi, we held that a racetrack trainer suspended for 15 days on suspicion of horse drugging was entitled to a prompt postdeprivation administrative or judicial hearing. 443 U. S., at 63-64. And in Mallen, we held that the president of a Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insured bank suspended from office by the FDIC was accorded due process by a notice and hearing procedure which would render a decision within 90 days of the suspension. 486 U. S., at 241-243. See also Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay View, 395 U. S. 337 (1969) (holding that due process requires notice and a hearing before wages may be garnished).

In each of these cases, the claimant was denied a right by virtue of which he was presently entitled either to exercise ownership dominion over real or personal property, or to pursue a gainful occupation. Unlike those claimants, respondent has not been denied any present entitlement. G & G has been deprived of payment that it contends it is owed under a contract, based on the State's determination that G & G failed to comply with the contract's terms. G & G has only a claim that it did comply with those terms and therefore that it is entitled to be paid in full. Though we assume for purposes of decision here that G & G has a property interest in its claim for payment, see supra, at 195, it is an interest, unlike the interests discussed above, that can be fully protected by an ordinary breach-of-contract suit.

In Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 895 (1961) (citations omitted), we said:

"The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation. ' "[D]ue process," unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed

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