Cite as: 532 U. S. 514 (2001)
Opinion of the Court
an illegal interception in § 2511(1)(d),10 subsection (c) is not a regulation of conduct. It is true that the delivery of a tape recording might be regarded as conduct, but given that the purpose of such a delivery is to provide the recipient with the text of recorded statements, it is like the delivery of a handbill or a pamphlet, and as such, it is the kind of "speech" that the First Amendment protects.11 As the majority
below put it, "[i]f the acts of 'disclosing' and 'publishing' information do not constitute speech, it is hard to imagine what does fall within that category, as distinct from the category of expressive conduct." 200 F. 3d, at 120.
VI
As a general matter, "state action to punish the publication of truthful information seldom can satisfy constitutional standards." Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U. S. 97, 102 (1979). More specifically, this Court has repeatedly
10 The Solicitor General has cataloged some of the cases that fall under subsection (d): "[I]t is unlawful for a company to use an illegally intercepted communication about a business rival in order to create a competing product; it is unlawful for an investor to use illegally intercepted communications in trading in securities; it is unlawful for a union to use an illegally intercepted communication about management (or vice versa) to prepare strategy for contract negotiations; it is unlawful for a supervisor to use information in an illegally recorded conversation to discipline a subordinate; and it is unlawful for a blackmailer to use an illegally intercepted communication for purposes of extortion. See, e. g., 1968 Senate Report 67 (corporate and labor-management uses); Fultz v. Gilliam, 942 F. 2d 396, 400 n. 4 (6th Cir. 1991) (extortion); Dorris v. Absher, 959 F. Supp. 813, 815-817 (M. D. Tenn. 1997) (workplace discipline), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 179 F. 3d 420 (6th Cir. 1999). The statute has also been held to bar the use of illegally intercepted communications for important and socially valuable purposes. See In re Grand Jury, 111 F. 3d 1066, 1077-1079 (3d Cir. 1997)." Brief for United States 24.
11 Put another way, what gave rise to statutory liability in this suit was the information communicated on the tapes. See Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F. 3d 463, 484 (CADC 1999) (Sentelle, J., dissenting) ("What . . . is being punished . . . here is not conduct dependent upon the nature or origin of the tapes; it is speech dependent upon the nature of the contents").
527
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