610
VIRGINIA DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES Scalia, J., concurring
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 28. Although we do not doubt the ability of district courts to perform the nuanced "three thresholds" test required by the "catalyst theory"—whether the claim was colorable rather than groundless; whether the lawsuit was a substantial rather than an insubstantial cause of the defendant's change in conduct; whether the defendant's change in conduct was motivated by the plaintiff's threat of victory rather than threat of expense, see post, at 627-628 (dissenting opinion)— it is clearly not a formula for "ready administrability." Burlington v. Dague, 505 U. S. 557, 566 (1992).
Given the clear meaning of "prevailing party" in the fee-shifting statutes, we need not determine which way these various policy arguments cut. In Alyeska, 421 U. S., at 260, we said that Congress had not "extended any roving authority to the Judiciary to allow counsel fees as costs or otherwise whenever the courts might deem them warranted." To disregard the clear legislative language and the holdings of our prior cases on the basis of such policy arguments would be a similar assumption of a "roving authority." For the reasons stated above, we hold that the "catalyst theory" is not a permissible basis for the award of attorney's fees under the FHAA, 42 U. S. C. § 3613(c)(2), and ADA, 42 U. S. C. § 12205.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joins, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court in its entirety, and write to respond at greater length to the contentions of the dissent.
I
"Prevailing party" is not some newfangled legal term invented for use in late-20th-century fee-shifting statutes.
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