744
Syllabus
the Court's determination that the consent decree proposed a wholly permissible final resolution of the controversy both as to facts and law, 426 U. S., at 368-369. The Court rejected the dissenters' view that the decree interpreted the middle-of-the-river language "by agreements of convenience" and not "in accordance with legal principles," id., at 369. New Hampshire's contention that the 1977 consent decree was entered without a searching historical inquiry into what "Middle of the River" meant is refuted by the pleadings in the lateral marine boundary case and by this Court's independent determination that nothing suggests the location of the 1740 boundary agreed upon by the States is wholly contrary to relevant evidence, ibid. Nor can it be said that New Hampshire lacked the opportunity or incentive to locate the river boundary at Maine's shore. In its present complaint, New Hampshire relies on historical materials that were no less available in the 1970's than they are today. And New Hampshire had every reason to consult those materials: A river boundary running along Maine's shore would have resulted in a substantial amount of additional territory for New Hampshire. Pp. 752-755.
(d) Also unavailing is New Hampshire's reliance on this Court's recognition that the doctrine of estoppel or that part of it which precludes inconsistent positions in judicial proceedings is ordinarily not applied to States, Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U. S. 362, 369. This is not a case where estoppel would compromise a governmental interest in enforcing the law. Cf. Heckler v. Community Health Services of Crawford Cty., Inc., 467 U. S. 51, 60. Nor is this a case where the shift in the government's position results from a change in public policy, cf. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U. S. 591, 601, or a change in facts essential to the prior judgment, cf. Montana v. United States, 440 U. S. 147, 159. Instead, it is a case between two States, in which each owes the other a full measure of respect. The Court is unable to discern any substantial public policy interest allowing New Hampshire to construe "Middle of the River" differently today than it did 25 years ago. Pp. 755-756.
Motion to dismiss complaint granted.
Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except Souter, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Paul D. Stern, Deputy Attorney General of Maine, argued the cause for defendant. With him on the briefs were An-
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