Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 9 (2001)

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166

CEDRIC KUSHNER PROMOTIONS, LTD. v. KING

Opinion of the Court

for the criminal acts of its employees where Congress so intends, Brief for Respondents 20-21, and (3) the Sherman Act principle limiting liability under 15 U. S. C. 1 by excluding "from unlawful combinations or conspiracies the activities of a single firm," Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U. S. 752, 769-770, n. 15 (1984). The alternative that we endorse, however, is no less consistent with these principles. It does not deny that a corporation acts through its employees; it says only that the corporation and its employees are not legally identical. It does not assert that ordinary respondeat superior principles make a corporation legally liable under RICO for the criminal acts of its employees; that is a matter of congressional intent not before us. See, e. g., Gasoline Sales, Inc., 39 F. 3d, at 73 (holding that corporation cannot be "vicariously liable" for 1962(c) violations committed by its vice president). Neither is it inconsistent with antitrust law's intracorporate conspiracy doctrine; that doctrine turns on specific antitrust objectives. See Copperweld Corp., supra, at 770-771. Rather, we hold simply that the need for two distinct entities is satisfied; hence, the RICO provision before us applies when a corporate employee unlawfully conducts the affairs of the corporation of which he is the sole owner—whether he conducts those affairs within the scope, or beyond the scope, of corporate authority.

For these reasons, the Court of Appeals' judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

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