Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 11 (2002)

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172

MICKENS v. TAYLOR

Opinion of the Court

tion consistent with the Wood Court's earlier description of why it could not decide the case without a remand: "On the record before us, we cannot be sure whether counsel was influenced in his basic strategic decisions by the interests of the employer who hired him. If this was the case, the due process rights of petitioners were not respected . . . ." 450 U. S., at 272 (emphasis added). The notion that Wood created a new rule sub silentio—and in a case where certiorari had been granted on an entirely different question, and the parties had neither briefed nor argued the conflict-of-interest issue—is implausible.5

Petitioner's proposed rule of automatic reversal when there existed a conflict that did not affect counsel's performance, but the trial judge failed to make the Sullivan-mandated inquiry, makes little policy sense. As discussed, the rule applied when the trial judge is not aware of the

Wood footnote). As we have explained earlier, n. 3, supra, this dictum simply contradicts the remand order in Wood.

5 We have used "actual conflict of interest" elsewhere to mean what was required to be shown in Sullivan. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U. S. 648, 662, n. 31 (1984) ("[W]e have presumed prejudice when counsel labors under an actual conflict of interest . . . . See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U. S. 335 (1980)"). And we have used "conflict of interest" to mean a division of loyalties that affected counsel's performance. In Holloway, 435 U. S., at 482, we described our earlier opinion in Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60 (1942), as follows: "The record disclosed that Stewart failed to cross-examine a Government witness whose testimony linked Glasser with the conspiracy and failed to object to the admission of arguably inadmissible evidence. This failure was viewed by the Court as a result of Stewart's desire to protect Kretske's interests, and was thus 'indicative of Stewart's struggle to serve two masters . . . .' [315 U. S.], at 75. After identifying this conflict of interests, the Court declined to inquire whether the prejudice flowing from it was harmless and instead ordered Glasser's conviction reversed." (Emphasis added.)

Thus, the Sullivan standard is not properly read as requiring inquiry into actual conflict as something separate and apart from adverse effect. An "actual conflict," for Sixth Amendment purposes, is a conflict of interest that adversely affects counsel's performance.

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