Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 29 (2002)

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262

ASHCROFT v. FREE SPEECH COALITION

Opinion of O'Connor, J.

the Court exclude youthful adult and virtual child pornography from the protection of the First Amendment.

I agree with the Court's decision not to grant this request. Because the Government may already prohibit obscenity without violating the First Amendment, see Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 23 (1973), what the Government asks this Court to rule is that it may also prohibit youthful adult and virtual child pornography that is merely indecent without violating that Amendment. Although such pornography looks like the material at issue in New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747 (1982), no children are harmed in the process of creating such pornography. Id., at 759. Therefore, Ferber does not support the Government's ban on youthful adult and virtual child pornography. See ante, at 249-251. The Government argues that, even if the production of such pornography does not directly harm children, this material aids and abets child abuse. See ante, at 251-254. The Court correctly concludes that the causal connection between pornographic images that "appear" to include minors and actual child abuse is not strong enough to justify withdrawing First Amendment protection for such speech. See ante, at 250.

I also agree with the Court's decision to strike down the CPPA's ban on material presented in a manner that "conveys the impression" that it contains pornographic depictions of actual children ("actual child pornography"). 18 U. S. C. § 2256(8)(D). The Government fails to explain how this ban serves any compelling state interest. Any speech covered by § 2256(8)(D) that is obscene, actual child pornography, or otherwise indecent is prohibited by other federal statutes. See §§ 1460-1466 (obscenity), 2256(8)(A), (B) (actual child pornography), 2256(8)(B) (youthful adult and virtual child pornography). The Court concludes that § 2256(8)(D) is overbroad, but its reasoning also persuades me that the provision is not narrowly tailored. See ante, at 257-258. The provision therefore fails strict scrutiny. United States

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