property from another. This Court has recognized that New York's "obtaining" requirement entailed both a deprivation and acquisition of property, see United States v. Enmons, 410 U. S. 396, 406, n. 16, and has construed the Hobbs Act provision at issue to require both features, see, e. g., id., at 400. It is undisputed that petitioners interfered with, disrupted, and in some instances completely deprived respondents of their ability to exercise their property rights. Likewise, petitioners' counsel has acknowledged that aspects of his clients' conduct were criminal. But even when their acts of interference and disruption achieved their ultimate goal of shutting down an abortion clinic, such acts did not constitute extortion because petitioners did not "obtain" respondents' property. Petitioners may have deprived or sought to deprive respondents of their alleged property right of exclusive control of their business assets, but they did not acquire any such property. They neither pursued nor received "something of value from" respondents that they could exercise, transfer, or sell. United States v. Nardello, 393 U. S. 286, 290. To conclude that their actions constituted extortion would effectively discard the statutory "obtaining" requirement and eliminate the recognized distinction between extortion and the separate crime of coercion. The latter crime, which more accurately describes the nature of petitioners' actions, involves the use of force or threat of force to restrict another's freedom of action. It was clearly defined in the New York Penal Code as a separate, and lesser, offense than extortion when Congress turned to New York law in drafting the Hobbs Act. Congress' decision to include extortion as a violation of the Hobbs Act and omit coercion is significant here, as is the fact that the Anti-Racketeering Act, the predecessor to the Hobbs Act, contained sections explicitly prohibiting both. The Hobbs Act omission is particularly significant because a paramount congressional concern in drafting that Act was to be clear about what conduct was prohibited, United States v. Culbert, 435 U. S. 371, 378, and to carefully define the Act's key terms, including "extortion," id., at 373. Thus, while coercion and extortion overlap to the extent that extortion necessarily involves the use of coercive conduct to obtain property, there has been and continues to be a recognized difference between these two crimes. Because the Hobbs Act is a criminal statute, it must be strictly construed, and any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of lenity. Enmons, supra, at 411. Cul-bert, supra, at 373, distinguished. If the distinction between extortion and coercion, which controls these cases, is to be abandoned, such a significant expansion of the law's coverage must come from Congress, not from the courts. Pp. 400-409.
(b) This Court's determination as to Hobbs Act extortion renders insufficient the other bases or predicate acts of racketeering supportingPage: Index Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Next
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