522
Opinion of the Court
precedent establishing that " 'any policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of government.' " 426 U. S., at 81, n. 17 (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580, 588-589 (1952)). And, since Mathews, this Court has firmly and repeatedly endorsed the proposition that Congress may make rules as to aliens that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens. See, e. g., Zadvydas, 533 U. S., at 718 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The liberty rights of the aliens before us here are subject to limitations and conditions not applicable to citizens"); Reno v. Flores, 507 U. S. 292, 305-306 (1993) ("Thus, 'in the exercise of its broad power over immigration and naturalization, "Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens" ' " (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U. S. 787, 792 (1977), in turn quoting Mathews, supra, at 79-80)); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U. S. 259, 273 (1990).
In his habeas corpus challenge, respondent did not contest Congress' general authority to remove criminal aliens from the United States. Nor did he argue that he himself was not "deportable" within the meaning of § 1226(c).6 Rather,
6 Respondent's concession on this score is relevant for two reasons: First, because of the concession, respondent by his own choice did not receive one of the procedural protections otherwise provided to aliens detained under § 1226(c). And, second, because of the concession we do not reach a contrary argument raised by respondent for the first time in his brief on the merits in this Court. Specifically, in his brief on the merits, respondent suggests that he might not be subject to detention under § 1226(c) after all because his 1997 conviction for petty theft with priors might not qualify as an aggravated felony under recent Ninth Circuit precedent. Respondent now states that he intends to argue at his next removal hearing that "his 1997 conviction does not constitute an aggravated felony . . . and his 1996 conviction [for first-degree burglary] does not constitute either an aggravated felony or a crime involving moral turpitude." Brief for Respondent 11-12. As respondent has conceded that he is deportable for purposes of his habeas corpus challenge to § 1226(c) at all previous stages of this proceeding, see n. 3, supra, we decide the case on that basis.
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