Cite as: 540 U. S. 519 (2004)
Opinion of the Court
cers' actions did not violate the Sixth Amendment standards established in Massiah, supra, and its progeny.
Second, because of its erroneous determination that petitioner was not questioned in violation of Sixth Amendment standards, the Court of Appeals improperly conducted its "fruits" analysis under the Fifth Amendment. Specifically, it applied Elstad to hold that the admissibility of the jail-house statements turns solely on whether the statements were " 'knowingly and voluntarily made.' " 285 F. 3d, at 724 (quoting Elstad, 470 U. S., at 309). The Court of Appeals did not reach the question whether the Sixth Amendment requires suppression of petitioner's jailhouse statements on the ground that they were the fruits of previous questioning conducted in violation of the Sixth Amendment deliberate-elicitation standard. We have not had occasion to decide whether the rationale of Elstad applies when a suspect makes incriminating statements after a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel notwithstanding earlier police questioning in violation of Sixth Amendment standards. We therefore remand to the Court of Appeals to address this issue in the first instance.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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