Cite as: 540 U. S. 526 (2004)
Syllabus
ambiguous in light of its predecessor. He claims that subsection (A)'s "attorney" is facially irreconcilable with the section's first part since the two parts' lists were previously parallel. He claims also that only a drafting error can explain the missing conjunction "or" between "an examiner" and "a professional person" since the text was previously grammatically correct. The starting point in discerning congressional intent, however, is the existing statutory text, Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U. S. 432, and not predecessor statutes. So this Court begins with the present statute. Pp. 533-534. (b) That the present statute is awkward, and even ungrammatical, does not make it ambiguous on the point at issue. A debtor's attorney not engaged under § 327 does not fall within the eligible class of persons that the first part of § 330(a)(1) authorizes to receive compensation: trustees, examiners, and § 327 professional persons. Subsection (A) allows compensation for services rendered by four types of persons (the same three plus attorneys), but unless an applicant is in one of the classes named in the first part, the kind of service rendered is irrelevant. The missing "or" does not change this conclusion. Numerous federal statutes inadvertently lack a conjunction, but are read for their plain meaning. Here, the missing "or" neither alters the text's substance nor obscures its meaning. Subsection (A)'s nonparalleled fourth category also does not cloud the statute's meaning. "Attorney" can be straightforwardly read to refer to those attorneys who qualify as § 327 professional persons. Likewise, neighboring § 331, which permits both debtors' attorneys and § 327 professional persons to receive interim compensation, most straightforwardly refers to § 327 debtors' attorneys. This reading may make "attorney" in § 330(a)(1)(A) surplusage, but surplusage does not always produce ambiguity. When there are two ways to read the text—either attorney is surplusage, which makes the text plain, or attorney is nonsurplusage, which makes the text ambiguous— applying a rule against surplusage is inappropriate. Pp. 534-536. (c) The plain meaning that § 330(a)(1) sets forth does not lead to absurd results. Petitioner's arguments—that this Court's interpretation will lead to a departure from the principle of prompt and effectual administration of bankruptcy law and attributes to Congress an intent to eliminate compensation essential to debtors' receipt of legal services— overstate § 330(a)(1)'s effect. Compensation remains available through various permitted means. Compensation for debtors' attorneys in Chapter 12 and 13 bankruptcies, for example, is not much disturbed by § 330 as a whole. Moreover, compensation for debtors' attorneys in Chapter 7 proceedings is not altogether prohibited. Sections 327 and
527
Page: Index Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 NextLast modified: October 4, 2007