Postal Service v. Flamingo Industries (USA) Ltd., 540 U.S. 736, 10 (2004)

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Cite as: 540 U. S. 736 (2004)

Opinion of the Court

tity as a "person" under the Act. The federal prohibition, for instance, binds state governmental bodies. See Georgia v. Evans, 316 U. S. 159 (1942); see also Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U. S. 308 (1978).

It is otherwise, however, when liability is pursued against the Federal Government. The Court made this proposition clear in United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U. S. 600, 614 (1941). The question in Cooper was whether, under the Sherman Act, the United States was a person who could bring a treble-damages claim for its own alleged antitrust injury. The Court held the United States could not sue for antitrust damages because it is not a person under the antitrust statute. Id., at 606-607. Important to the present case is an explicit reason given by the Cooper Court for reaching its decision. The Court observed that if the definition of "person" included the United States, then the Government would be exposed to liability as an antitrust defendant, a result Congress could not have intended. Id., at 607, 609.

After Cooper, Congress amended the antitrust statutes to allow the United States to bring antitrust suits. For our purposes, the means by which it did so is instructive. Congress did not change the definition of "person" in the statute, but added a new section allowing the United States to sue. See 15 U. S. C. § 15a. So, Cooper's conclusion that the United States is not an antitrust "person," in particular not a person who can be an antitrust defendant, was unaltered by Congress' action; indeed, the means Congress used to amend the antitrust law implicitly ratified Cooper's conclusion that the United States is not a proper antitrust defendant. See 312 U. S., at 609; Sea-Land, supra, at 245 ("Although Congress was well aware of the view the Court indicated in Cooper Corp., that Congress had not described the United States as a 'person' for Sherman Act purposes, Congress addressed only the direct holding in that case—the ruling that the United States was not authorized to proceed

745

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