Ex parte KRUEGER et al. - Page 2




                Appeal No. 95-4633                                                                                                            
                Application 07/135,067                                                                                                        


                examiner's rejection of claims 1-6 and 8-11 under the judicially created doctrine of obviousness-type                         

                double patenting over claims 1-11 of Krueger I (Patent No. 4,547,420) or claims 1-17 of  Krueger II                           

                (Patent No. 4,795,668).  We have carefully considered each of the arguments advanced by the appellants                        

                in their request for rehearing.  However, those arguments do not persuade us that our decision was in error.                  

                         We do not find, on this record, evidence to show that the PTO controlled the rate of prosecution                     

                which led to the issuance of the Krueger I and II patents first.  Appellants point to the “replacement”                       

                rejections during the prosecution of K/D Application II wherein in the examiner applied new prior art in                      

                the first Office action in K/D Application II from that asserted in the K/D Application I and then again                      

                applied new prior art in the second Office action in K/D Application II.  We find nothing unusual with these                  

                “replacement” rejections since appellants voluntarily abandoned K/D Application I in favor of K/D                             

                Application II and since the examiner’s “replacement” rejection in the second action in K/D Application                       

                II was dictated by an amendment to claim 1 made by appellants following the first Office action.  We do                       

                not find these events as PTO controlling the rate of prosecution.  The examiner handled the applications                      

                in a timely manner and made the second Office action in the K/D Application II final in spite of the                          

                “replacement” rejection.  In any event, appellants did not appeal the examiner’s decision, but instead                        

                abandoned the application in favor of K/D Application III in which they subsequently elected not to                           

                prosecute the claimed subject matter                                                                                          




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