Ex parte KRUEGER et al. - Page 5




                Appeal No. 95-4633                                                                                                            
                Application 07/135,067                                                                                                        


                applications and that their actions were dictated by the PTO.                                                                 

                         First, we must point out that the part of our decision referred to above was not intended to point                   

                to any impropriety in the prosecution of the applications by counsel for appellants.  The remarks were                        

                intended to merely point out that counsel was controlling the rate of prosecution of the applications in the                  

                PTO in view of the fact that alternative courses of action were open to counsel and that counsel voluntarily                  

                elected a particular course of action such as abandoning application K/D Application I rather than                            

                appealing the examiner’s final rejection and/or petitioning for supervisory review of the examiner’s                          
                requirement under 37 CFR § 1.78(c).   These actions were in no way controlled by any action taken by5                                                                                     

                the PTO.                                                                                                                      

                         Second, while we agree that a double patenting rejection had not been made until the first Office                    

                action in this application (Paper No. 8, ¶¶ 16 and 17), the double patenting issue has been present since                     

                the first Office actions in the first K/D and K/M applications by virtue of the facts that both applications                  

                were commonly owned and that the examiner made requirements under 37 CFR § 1.78(c).  At that time,                            

                the examiner made a determination that the claims of both applications were directed to a “single inventive                   

                concept.”  Under PTO practice and procedure, any requirement under 37 CFR § 1.78(c) involving                                 

                         We note that the examiner made a similar requirement under 37 CFR § 1.78(c) in the first Office action in K/M5                                                                                                                   
                Application I noting the claims in that application were in conflict with the claims in K/D Application I.  However, the      
                examiner dropped the requirement in the second Office action of K/M Application I while at the same time maintaining          
                the requirement in the second Office action of K/D Application I.  It would appear from these facts that grounds existed      
                for a petition for supervisory review since it appears to be inconsistent for the examiner to assert that the claims in K/D   
                Application I are in conflict with the claims in K/M Application I while at the same time not asserting that the claims in    
                K/M Application I are in conflict with the claims in K/D Application I.                                                       
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