Ex parte LEE et al. - Page 6




                     Appeal No. 96-0289                                                                                                                                                
                     Application 07/935,301                                                                                                                                            


                     current passed through the link melts the metal (page 5; Fig. 2).  Fujita does not state that the current is                                                      

                     programming current.  However, appellants acknowledge that it was known in the art to melt such links                                                             
                     by use of programming current.   Also,  the examiner argues that Takemae discloses (col. 5, lines 55-3                                                                                                                    

                     62) use of programming current to melt fuse links (final rejection, paper no. 10, page 3), and appellants                                                         

                     do not challenge this argument (brief, page 7).                                                                                                                   

                                Appellants argue that Fujita’s metal is not absorbed by a polysilicon pad (brief, pages 5-9).                                                          

                     We are not persuaded by this argument for the reasons given above regarding the rejection of claim 19                                                             

                     under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).  See Best, 562 F.2d 1252, 1255, 195 USPQ 430, 433-34 (“Whether the                                                                      

                     rejection is based on ‘inherency’ under 35 U.S.C. § 102, on ‘prima facie obviousness’ under 35                                                                    

                     U.S.C. § 103, jointly or alternatively, the burden of proof is the same, and its fairness is evidenced by                                                         

                     the PTO’s inability to manufacture products or to obtain and compare prior art products.”).                                                                       

                                For the above reasons, we conclude, based on the preponderance of the evidence and                                                                     

                     argument in the record, that appellants’ claimed invention would have been obvious to one of ordinary                                                             

                     skill in the art within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 103.4                                                                                                          




                                3It is axiomatic that our consideration of the prior art must, of necessity, include consideration                                                     
                     of the admitted state of the art.  See In re Hedges, 783 F.2d 1038, 1039-40, 228 USPQ 685, 686                                                                    
                     (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Davis, 305 F.2d 501, 503, 134 USPQ 256, 258 (CCPA 1962).                                                                                  
                                4A discussion of Choi is not necessary to our decision.                                                                                                
                                                                                          6                                                                                            





Page:  Previous  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  Next 

Last modified: November 3, 2007