Appeal No. 97-1974
Application 08/286,696
reasonable in light of all the evidence before the
Board. As the cases cited above demonstrate, our
predecessor court had on several prior occasions
interpreted the term "integral" to cover more than a
unitary construction. See, e.g., In re Kohno, 391
F.2d 959, 157 USPQ 275 (CCPA 1968), In re Dike, 394
F.2d 584, 157 USPQ 581 (CCPA 1968), In re Larson,
340 F.2d 965, 144 USPQ 347 (CCPA 1965), and In re
Clark, 214 F.2d 148, 102 USPQ 241 (CCPA 1954). This
court has also endorsed that interpretation. See,
e.g., Advanced Cardiovascular Sys. v. Scimed Life
Sys., 887 F.2d 1070, 1074, 12 USPQ2d 1530, 1542
(Fed. Cir. 1989) (nothing of record limited "inte-
gral" to mean "of one-piece" construc-tion).
Appellants' attempt to distinguish these cases
misses the point. Absent an express definition in
their specification, the fact that appellants can
point to definitions or usages that conform to their
interpretation does not make the PTO's definition
unreasonable when the PTO can point to other sources
that support its interpretation.
Here, looking at appellants' specification, we find no express
definition therein of "integral" or "integrally formed".
There-fore, in accordance with In re Morris, we interpret
"integrally formed" as covering the bolted-together
construction of base 12 and upper flowerpot holder 26 of
Shepherd, and consequently con-clude that Shepherd anticipates
the apparatus recited in claim 1. As for claim 2,
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