ENGVALL et al. V. DAVID et al. - Page 17




                   Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1564, 19 USPQ2d 111, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1991).  Thus, the                                                       
                   materiality of the limitation is simply irrelevant to the written description requirement.                                                          
                             In this regard, we note that Engvall chose to file an amendment copying claims from the David                                             
                   patent in order to provoke this interference.  However, there is no need to copy claims exactly to                                                  
                   provoke an interference.  An applicant only needs to have patentable claims in the application which                                                
                   are (1) clearly supported by the specification (37 CFR § 1.75(d)(1)) and (2) are directed to the “same                                              
                   patentable invention” as claimed by the patentee (37 CFR §§ 1.601(i) & (n) (1986)).  An interference                                                
                   can exist even where the scope of the claims of the parties do not overlap.  See Aelony v. Arni, 547                                                
                   F.2d 566, 570, 192 USPQ 486, 489-90 (CCPA 1977) (a method for purifying a compound using                                                            
                   cyclopentadiene held to be the same patentable invention as a method using butadiene, isoprene,                                                     
                   dimethylbutadiene, piperylene, anthracene, perylene, furan and sorbic acid).                                                                        
                                       2.        Precedent                                                                                                             
                             The general test for determining whether later claimed subject matter is supported by an                                                  
                   earlier written description is whether the disclosure of the application "reasonably conveys to a person                                            
                   skilled in the art  that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter at the time of  the                                              
                   earlier filing date." Eiselstein v. Frank, 52 F.3d 1035, 1039,  34 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 (Fed. Cir.                                                     
                   1995);  Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co., Inc, 772 F.2d 1570, 1575, 227 USPQ 177, 179 (Fed. Cir.                                                   
                   1985); In re Kaslow, 707 F.2d 1366, 1375, 217 USPQ 1089, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 1983).  The                                                                
                   specification must provide information that clearly allows persons having ordinary skill in the art to                                              
                   recognize that the applicant invented the later claimed subject matter.  Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at                                                      
                   1563-64, 19 USPQ2d at 1116;  In re Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008, 1012, 10 USPQ2d 1614, 1618 (Fed.                                                         
                   Cir. 1989).  In Vas-Cath the court noted that the disclosure must "convey with reasonable clarity to                                                
                   those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, [the applicant] was in possession of the                                               
                   invention."  Vas-Cath,  935 F.2d at 1563-64, 19 USPQ2d at 1117. (Emphasis original.)  The court                                                     
                   went on to state that the "invention is, for the purpose of the 'written description' inquiry, whatever                                             
                   is now claimed."  Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1564, 19 USPQ2d at 1117.   (Emphasis original).                                                             
                             The Federal Circuit has analogized the determination of whether there is written descriptive                                              
                   support in a specification to following a trail through the forest by looking for “blaze marks” on                                                  
                   individual trees:                                                                                                                                   

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