Ex parte WESTERMAN et al. - Page 6




          Appeal No. 1998-0531                                                        
          Application 08/464,489                                                      


          [to be] given patentable weight since it is found in the                    
          preamble of the claim” is inappropriate.                                    
               Concerning functional language of the type found in the                
          preamble of claim 28 and the weight it is to be given, we                   
          point to the statement by the Court in In re Schreiber, 128                 
          F.3d 1473, 1478, 44 USPQ 1429, 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1997) that                   
                    [a] patent applicant is free to recite features                   
               of an apparatus either structurally or functionally.                   
               See In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 212, 169 USPQ                       
               226, 228 (CCPA 1971) (“[T]here is nothing                              
               intrinsically wrong with [defining something by what                   
               it does rather than what it is] in drafting patent                     
               claims.”).  Yet, choosing to define an element                         
               functionally, i.e., by what it does, carries with it                   
               a risk.  As our predecessor court stated in                            
               Swinehart, 439 F.2d at 213, 169 USPQ at 228:                           
                    where the Patent Office has reason to                             
                    believe that a functional limitation                              
                    asserted to be critical for establishing                          
                    novelty in the claimed subject matter may,                        
                    in fact, be an inherent characteristic of                         
                    the prior art, it  possesses the authority                        
                    to require the applicant to prove that the                        
                    subject matter shown to be in the prior art                       
                    does not possess the characteristic relied                        
                    on.                                                               
                    See also In re Hallman, 655 F.2d 212, 215, 210                    
               USPQ 609, 611 (CCPA 1981); In re Ludtke, 441 F.2d                      
               660, 663-64, 169 USPQ 563, 565-67 (CCPA 1971).                         
               Feldman, the examiner’s evidence of anticipation,                      


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