Appeal No. 1998-2017
Application No. 08/802,216
Although the use of the term “means” in the recitation of “video means” triggers a
presumption that the statutory procedures of 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph apply (see,
e.g., Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580, 1584, 39 USPQ2d 1783,
1787 (Fed. Cir. 1996)), the mere use of the term is not conclusive. The claims do not set
forth any function that is associated with the video means (except, perhaps, the implicit
function of receiving data from a magnetic tape, which is not a “video” function). We
therefore interpret the “video means” without reference to section 112, sixth paragraph.
See York Prod., Inc. v. Central Tractor Farm & Family Center, 99 F.3d 1568, 1574, 40
USPQ2d 1619, 1624 (Fed. Cir. 1996)(“Without a ‘means’ sufficiently connected to a
recited function, the presumption in use of the word ‘means’ does not operate.”).
However, we agree with appellants to the extent that appellants’ argument stands
for the proposition that the artisan would not have interpreted “video means” as inclusive of
a conventional fax machine, as disclosed by Moss. Appellants’ disclosure does not attach
any special definition to the word “video” that is different from its ordinary, accepted
meaning. Appellants use the word “video” in the sense of referring to video playback as on
a video terminal, consistent with the dictionary definition: “video...2: being, relating to, or
involving images on a television screen or computer display <~ terminal>.” Webster’s
Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, 1990 ed.2
2 Copy attached to this decision.
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