Interference No. 103,830
because a discharge caused a mechanical failure stemming from the overheating and cracking of
one or more parts.
Pacholok’s Diligence
The junior party contends it was diligent in the period from just prior to Hutmacher’s
entry into the field on July 11, 1994 to its filing date on January 3, 1995.
A party that seeks to establish reasonable diligence must account for the entire period
during which diligence is required; that period commences from a time just prior to the senior
party’s date to the junior party’s reduction to practice, either actual or constructive. Gould v.
Schawlow, 363 F.2d 908, 919, 150 USPQ 634, 643 (CCPA 1966). Public policy favors early
disclosure. Naber v. Cricchi, 567 F.2d 382, 385, n.5, 196 USPQ 294, 297, n.5 (CCPA 1977),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 826, 200 USPQ 64 (1978). During this period there must be “reasonably
continuous activity.” Burns v. Curtis, 172 F.2d 588, 591, 80 USPQ 587, 588-589 (CCPA 1949).
Evidence which is of a general nature to the effect that work was continuous and which has little
specificity as to dates and facts does not constitute the kind of evidence required to establish
diligence in the critical period. Kendall v. Searles, 173 F.2d 986, 992-93, 81 USPQ 363, 368
(CCPA 1949).
We hold that Pacholok has not established reasonable diligence in the critical period.
The only evidence tending to corroborate the inventor’s testimony with respect to diligence are
the documents identified as B60-B69. Exhibit B60 is dated January 4, 1994 and is well outside
the period with which we are concerned. Exhibits B61-69 cover the period October 27, 1994 to
December 2, 1994. Even assuming that the above exhibits establish diligence between
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