Appeal No. 2001-0058 Page 7
Application No. 281,815
pressure as to impart momentum sufficient to project it away from the vehicle in the form of
a discrete cloud, as is required by the claim.
Griffin is cited by the examiner for its teaching of “how a small amount of gelled fuel
may [be] ignited and expelled,” and Sargent and McKinnon for teaching “a gelled fuel may
be broken up into particle form prior to ignition” (Answer, page 2). The examiner has not
explained how the teachings of these references are to be interfaced with those of Lager
and Geeraert to meet the limitations of claim 1 that are not taught by the two basic
references and, left to our own devices, we are at a loss to appreciate how this would be
done.
The mere fact that the prior art structure could be modified does not make such a
modification obvious unless the prior art suggests the desirability of doing so. See In re
Gordon, 733 F.2d 900, 902, 221 USPQ 1125, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 1984). We fail to perceive
any teaching, suggestion or incentive which would have led one of ordinary skill in the art to
modify the Lager system in the manner proposed by the examiner other than the hindsight
afforded one who first viewed the appellant’s disclosure. This, or course, is not a proper
basis for a rejection under Section 103. See In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1264, 23
USPQ2d 1780, 1784 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the combined teachings of Lager,
Geeraert, Griffin, Sargent and McKinnon fail to establish a prima facie case of
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