2. Suppression or concealment in this case
One difficulty in this case is that the briefs, particularly
Morrison's briefs, do not call attention to evidence of
Morrison's activity between (1) Morrison's presumed actual
reduction to practice on 17 September 1991 and (2) the filing of
a patent application on 28 June 1993. In particular, the briefs
do not favor us with a discussion of the dates on which any
particular activity took place after Morrison's alleged actual
reduction to practice on 17 September 1991. See 37 CFR
§ 1.656(b)(5), requiring a statement of facts.
We, like the Federal Circuit in Lutzker v. Plet, decline to
decide other issues; rather, we will assume that Morrison
actually reduced to practice on 17 September 1991. We hold,
however, that the delay between that date and the filing of the
Morrison application is an "unreasonable delay" and therefore
raises an inference of intent to suppress or conceal. Since we
have not been directed to evidence of specific activity between
the two dates, any in particular when specific activity may have
taken place, we hold that Morrison has failed to overcome the
inference and therefore suppressed or concealed its actual
reduction to practice. Accordingly, Morrison cannot rely on a
17 September 1991 actual reduction to practice. There being no
other basis upon which Morrison can prevail, it follows that
Morrison has failed to establish priority within the meaning of
35 U.S.C. § 102(g) by a preponderance of the evidence.
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