Ex Parte QUAY - Page 6




          Appeal No. 2000-0827                                                        
          Application 08/466,104                                                      


               applicant must . . . convey with reasonable clarity to                 
               those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date                   
               sought, he or she was in possession of the invention."                 
               Vas-Cath[, Inc. v. Mahurkar], 935 F.2d [1555,] 1563-64,                
               19 USPQ2d [1111,] 1117 [(Fed. Cir. 1991)].                             
          In re Alton, 76 F.3d 1168, 1172, 37 USPQ2d 1578, 1583 (Fed. Cir.            
          1996)(emphasis omitted).  The examiner has the initial burden of            
          explaining why the disclosure as filed fails to describe the                
          subject matter recited in the rejected claims.  See Alton,                  
          76 F.3d at 1175, 37 USPQ2d at 1583:                                         
                    The examiner (or the Board, if the Board is the                   
               first body to raise a particular ground for  rejection)                
               "bears the initial burden . . . of presenting a prima                  
               facie case of unpatentability."  In re Oetiker,                        
               977 F.2d 1443, 1445, 24 USPQ2d 1443, 1444 (Fed. Cir.                   
               1992).  Insofar as the written description requirement                 
               is concerned, that burden is discharged by "presenting                 
               evidence or reasons why persons skilled in the art                     
               would not recognize in the disclosure a description of                 
               the invention defined by the claims."  [In re]                         
               Wertheim, 541 F.2d [257,] 263, 191 USPQ [90,] 97                       
               [(CCPA 1976)].                                                         
               The examiner indicates (Answer at 3) that the rejection is             
          based on the following passages in In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990,             
          154 USPQ 118 (CCPA 1967):                                                   
               Specific claims to single compounds require reasonably                 
               specific supporting disclosure and while we agree with                 
               the appellants, as the board did, that naming is not                   
               essential, something more than the disclosure of a                     
               class of 1000, or 100, or even 48, compounds is                        
               required.  Surely, given time, a chemist could name                    
               (especially with the aid of a computer) all of the half                
               million compounds within the scope of the broadest                     
               claim, which claim is supported by the broad                           

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