Appeal No. 2001-2019
Application No. 08/996,567 Page 5
burden of presenting a prima facie case of obviousness. Note In
re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445, 24 USPQ2d 1443, 1444 (Fed. Cir.
1992). If that burden is met, the burden then shifts to the
applicant to overcome the prima facie case with argument and/or
evidence. Obviousness is then determined on the basis of the
evidence as a whole. See id.; In re Hedges, 783 F.2d 1038, 1039,
228 USPQ 685, 686 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d
1468, 1472, 223 USPQ 785, 788 (Fed. Cir. 1984); and In re
Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048, 1052, 189 USPQ 143, 147 (CCPA 1976).
We consider first the rejection of claims 1, 2, 5-7, 11, and
12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Berry, III
in view of Markl. We begin with claim 1. The examiner's
position (answer, page 4) is that Berry, III does not
specifically state that alarm synchronization is effected by
changing voltage on the power lines. To make up for this
deficiency of Berry, III, the examiner turns to Markl for a
teaching of the "desirability of allowing plural lights to be
flashed in an alarm system all based on a common clocking action
to assure that flashing takes place at the intended time, the
activation of lights being triggered by a changing voltage level
over power lines 541, 542." The motivation offered by the
examiner (id.) is that "variation between activation times of
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