Ex Parte BRYANT - Page 4


               Appeal No. 2003-2130                                                                                                   
               Application 08/159,461                                                                                                 

               and annealing step can therefore result in two silicon nitride layers as disclosed in Haddad,                          
               appellant was not in possession of the method claimed using said clause in appealed claim 1 and                        
               the other claims here rejected, at the time the application was filed (answer, pages 7-8).                             
                       Appellant contends that the passage of the specification we refer to above “only describes                     
               implantation into the polysilicon layer without any teaching or suggestion of implantation [in]                        
               other layers,” and submits that “[a]bsent some evidence that nitrogen implantation into the                            
               polysilicon must inherently and necessarily result in implantation into other layers underlying the                    
               polysilicon, the claim limitation is adequately described in the specification” (brief, pages 7-9;                     
               see also reply brief, pages 2-5).                                                                                      
                       We agree with appellant.  The limitation of the here rejected appealed claims to a method                      
               wherein nitrogen ion implantation and annealing involves only the polysilicon layer is subject                         
               matter specifically described in the written description of the specification and thus, simply does                    
               not involve a negative limitation with respect to the remainder of the method as the examiner                          
               contends.  Indeed, as a matter of fact, the passage of the specification we refer to above makes                       
               clear, as appellant argues, that the concept of implantation of nitrogen ions and subsequent                           
               annealing involving only the polysilicon layer in the context of the disclosed method was within                       
               his possession at the time the application was filed, which is all that is required by § 112, first                    
               paragraph, written description requirement.  To the extent that the examiner’s position can be                         
               considered as under § 112, first paragraph, enablement requirement, the examiner has not                               
               supplied the record with evidence that, prima facie, one of ordinary skill in this art would have                      
               been unable to practice the method as claimed based on the information supplied in the written                         
               description in the present specification.2  Indeed, the passage from Haddad we refer to above                          
                                                                                                                                     
               2 It is well settled that under this statutory provision, the examiner has the burden of providing a                   
               reasonable explanation, supported by the record as a whole, why the assertions as to the scope of                      
               objective enablement set forth in the specification are in doubt, including reasons why the                            
               description of the invention in the specification would not have enabled one of ordinary skill in                      
               this art to practice the claimed invention without undue experimentation, in order to establish a                      
               prima facie case under the enablement requirement of the first paragraph of § 112.  See In re                          
               Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561, 27 USPQ2d 1510, 1513 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Wands, 858 F.2d                              
               731, 737, 8 USPQ2d 1400, 1404 (Fed. Cir. 1988); In re Strahilevitz, 668 F.2d 1229, 1232,                               
               212 USPQ 561, 563 (CCPA 1982); In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 223-24, 169 USPQ 367,                                    
               369-70 (CCPA 1971).  It is further well settled that “[a]n inventor need not . . . explain every                       

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