Appeal Number: 2006-1650
Application Number: 09/903,500
3) The debtor/customer cannot select electronic delivery without agreeing to
the electronic payment transmittal charge.
4) A debtor/customer is unlikely to pay for services the debtor/customer
does not desire, i.e. payment for services implies a desire for those services.
The debtor/customer cannot select electronic delivery without agreeing to
the electronic payment transmittal charge, because to enable electronic payment of
transmittal charges the debtor/customer must submit a signed written agreement
acceding to these charges. As disclosed, unless the debtor/customer chooses to pay
this fee, the debtor/customer cannot receive electronic billing. There is simply no
choice offered for electronic payment without payment of the electronic transmittal
charges. Thus, the agreement to pay the transmittal charges is an agreement, that
implies a preference, to receive an electronic bill—and it is the customer’s choice,
the customer’s preference. It is a necessity for a recipient to choose electronic
billing if the recipient agrees to the electronic transmittal fee and signs the written
agreement to be responsible for electronic transmittal charges. Thus, we are in
agreement with the Examiner and the prior Panel that the preference for an
electronic bill as against a paper one is inherent in the choice made by the recipient
to select electronic transmittal in the disclosed process of Comesanas. Since the
argued “delivery preference” in inherent in the prior art, Comesanas renders
obvious the subject matter of Appellant’s independent claims.
CONCLUSION
Inasmuch as the examiner has established the prima facie obviousness of
independent claims 12 and 18 on appeal, the rejection of all claims on appeal is
affirmed.
ORDER
8
Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Next
Last modified: September 9, 2013