Appeal 2006-2786
Application 10/240,329
[of the milking machine]” such that Tamas does not use transparency
sensing to control foremilk removal (Br. 11).
We agree with the Appellants’ arguments for the reasons discussed
below.
Claim 15 recites that the “transparency of the milk is sensed at least
during an initial period of the main milking stage” (claim 15). Claim 19
recites “a transparency sensing means for sensing the transparency of the
milk extracted from the teat by the teat cup” (claim 19). In contrast, Tamas
discloses that “segregation of bloody, and purulent milk respectively is
accomplished on the basis of its colour” (Tamas, col. 2, ll. 18-19).
Moreover, Tamas discloses that the “first squirts of milk” (i.e., the foremilk)
are removed based upon the “length of time” or “number of pulses,” not the
sensed transparency (Tamas, col. 1, l. 61 to col. 2, l. 6).
Therefore, Tamas does not disclose either expressly or inherently the
claim features “the transparency of the milk is sensed” (claim 15) or “a
transparency sensing means” (claim 19). Anticipation requires that each
claim feature be found either expressly or inherently in the prior art.
Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of California, 814 F.2d 628, 631, 2
USPQ2d 1051, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1987). It follows that Tamas fails to
anticipate claims 15 and 19.
We reverse the Examiner’s § 102(b) rejection over Tamas of
independent claims 15 and 19 and of dependent claims 16-18 and 20-23.
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) REJECTION OVER TAMAS IN VIEW OF BRAYER
As discussed above regarding the § 102(b) rejection over Tamas,
Tamas fails to discloses sensing the transparency of the milk or using a
11
Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Next
Last modified: September 9, 2013