Ruby Jean Stevens - Page 9




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          ownership of the property.  See United States v. Gilmore, 372               
          U.S. 39, 44 (1963); Reed v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 32, 42 (1970);            
          Duntley v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987-579.  Therefore, to be             
          deductible under section 212, professional expenses must be                 
          directly connected or proximately related to the management,                
          conservation, or maintenance of the property.  See Bingham Trust            
          v. Commissioner, supra at 375; Duntley v. Commissioner, supra.              
               Conversely, expenditures paid or incurred in defending or              
          perfecting title to property, such as legal expenses in a suit to           
          quiet title to real estate and expenses paid to protect one's               
          right to property of a decedent as a beneficiary under a                    
          testamentary trust, constitute a part of the cost of property and           
          are not deductible expenses.  See Woodward v. Commissioner, 397             
          U.S. 572, 575 (1970); Boagni v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 708, 711-             
          712 (1973); sec. 1.212-1(k), Income Tax Regs.; see also sec.                
          1.263(a)-2(c), Income Tax Regs., which classifies "The cost of              
          defending or perfecting title to property" as a capital                     
          expenditure.                                                                
               Petitioner contends that the disallowed professional fees at           
          issue in this case are deductible under section 212, because (1)            
          defending against the lawsuit protected her taxable income                  
          stream, and (2) the fees were ordinary and necessary expenses               
          incurred in that effort.  Petitioner also contends that the                 
          disallowed professional fees qualify as ordinary and necessary              





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